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Goldston: Romanian Criminal Justice

AN AMERICAN PROSECUTOR'S VIEW OF
ROMANIAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE

James A. Goldston*
During the fall of 1995, I was selected by the United States
Department of Justice to spend three months in Bucharest as a
Resident Legal Advisor to the Romanian Prosecutor General's
Office. This opportunity was provided by the United States
Information Service through its Rule of Law Program. At the
time, I had been a prosecutor for almost five years and was
serving as an Assistant United States Attorney in the Organized
Crime Unit of the Southern District of New York. 1
Having left for Romania the day after a Los Angeles jury
acquitted 0. J. Simpson of murder, I was keenly aware of the
danger of seeing everything through American eyes and offering
American solutions for Romanian problems. I was determined
* The following comments are offered as candid assessments based on
my own experience over the course of three months working with prosecutors
and speaking with numerous knowledgeable observers of the criminal justice
system in Romania. In the exercise of caution. I should note what is perhaps
obvious -- that many comments are in no way intended as personal indictments
of anyone. Public service in a communist government, particularly the
uniquely distorted brand which existed under President Ceausescu. led
numerous persons of good will to make choices they might not have made had
conditions been different. I harbor great affection for the overwhelming
majority of prosecutors with whom I came into contact. My hosts at the
Romanian Prosecutor General's Office generously attempted to accommodate
virtually every request for information and to assist in arranging numerous
meetings with a variety of government officials. In discussing cases, I have
made every effort to avoid referring to by name to particular individuals.
1.In March 1996, after more than five years as a federal prosecutor. I
left the United States Attorney's Office to work as a senior human rights
officer for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe ("OSCE")
Mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

503

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1997

1

Touro Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 2 [1997], Art. 9

504

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 13

not to simply compare everything I saw with the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure and then note critically the numerous
differences. Avoiding that pitfall would be difficult because, as
an American prosecutor steeped in the federal criminal justice
system, I had brought to Romania a particular perspective. This
perspective was shaped by experiences in supervising
investigations, conducting trials and arguing appeals in
accordance with federal law and federal rules of evidence.
Although I have attempted to avoid simple comparisons and
criticisms, my observations of Romania were necessarily molded
by the nature of the legal system for which I had been trained.
Most of my work at the Romanian Prosecutor General's Office
consisted of giving lectures and presentations to judges,
prosecutors and police officers on various aspects of American
federal criminal procedure and some of the investigative
techniques commonly employed in long-term federal criminal
investigations. The principal topics of these sessions included: (1)
the nature of, and federal law concerning, organized crime,
narcotics trafficking and money laundering in the United States;
(2) the use of informants, undercover agents, visual surveillance,
cooperation agreements, testimonial immunity, pen registers, trap
and trace devices, electronic surveillance, and search warrants(3) the nature of the adversary system, with attention to the
distinct roles of prosecutors. judges. and defense attorneys. and
(4) evidentiary rules and other checks on police and prosecutorial
authority in the federal criminal justice system. I devoted
substantial time observing Romanian criminal trials and
immersing myself in pre-indictment prosecutorial investigative
practices. During my three months in Romania, I engaged dozens
of prosecutors, judges and criminal defense attorneys in lengthy
discussions about the Romanian system's flaws, strengths, and
need for and susceptibility to reform.
Over the course of my assignment. I became familiar with
Romanian criminal procedure and the major actors in the criminal
justice system. The problems afflicting the system are deeply
rooted and will take the continued efforts of many individuals
over a number of years to correct. It is my hope that the Rule of
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Law program, together with the efforts of other visitors who have
devoted time and energy to the Romanian criminal justice system
over the years, may serve as the foundation for a more sustained
and systematic program of foreign assistance and cooperation in
the future.
This article will describe what I believe are some of the
principal problems which currently plague the Romanian criminal
justice system. My observations are not offered as a
comprehensive review of Romanian criminal procedure law, nor
do I pretend to have studied that law systematically. This is not
an overview of the way a typical criminal case proceeds from
beginning to end. Finally, this is not a systematic evaluation of
Romania's conformance with international due process and fair
trial standards.
As a prosecutor from the United States assigned to work with
my counterparts in Romania, I was permitted an insider's view of
the criminal justice system; an opportunity which is not widely
available. This analysis is necessarily selective, based on my
intimate, yet highly personal, observations of the system during
my time in the country. The actions of prosecutors commanded
much of my attention, given my assignment within the Prosecutor
General's Office and the central role prosecutors have
traditionally played and continue to play in the criminal justice
system. Ultimately, I hope to provide an accurate snapshot of the
way the Romanian criminal process works, day-to-day, in real
life, more than six years after the fall of Ceausescu in 1989.
Along the way I will identify some of the most egregious
problems in the present system and briefly suggest some possible
reforms. My objective is to assist the many independent
Romanian lawyers. researchers, and human rights and public
interest advocates struggling with few resources and often less
respect to build a humane and democratic society out of the ashes
of one of the harshest forms of communism in the former Eastern
bloc.
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I. THE ROMANIAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A
BRIEF SURVEY OF PROBLEMS
As I learned within days of my arrival, a number of
characteristics significantly distinguish the Romanian criminal
justice system from its federal counterpart in the United States.
Many of these differences seem morally indeterminate in that
neither system is unequivocally better or worse than the other in
accomplishing the tasks required of a criminal justice system.
Both systems strive to accurately solve crimes, identify the
guilty, clear the innocent, and bring about swift and
proportionate punishment. Indeed, many of the characteristics
which distinguish the Romanian system from the American
system are non-controversial. These differences represent rational
choices, appropriately made by different nations, to combat crime
and insure that justice is served.
The most obvious difference is the absence of an Americanstyle jury system. In Romania. as in many European countries,
judges, not lay citizens, find the facts in criminal cases. The
majority of Romanians I encountered were simply astounded that
a society as advanced as the United States would entrust to
common citizens the power to judge questions of guilt and
innocence, particularly in the aftermath of the Simpson verdict in
Los Angeles.
Romania's criminal justice system. like those in many of its
continental European partners. is less adversarial in nature than
the American system. In broad terms, Romanian prosecutors are
often more than advocates before the bar of justice. They play a
defining role in the investigative and trial stages of a case. This
broader role for the Romanian Prosecutor is significantly more
comprehensive than the role of defense counsel or, for that
2
matter, prosecutors in American courtrooms.
2. Many countries which, like Romania, have adopted what may
generally, if somewhat inaccurately, be termed an "inquisitorial" as opposed
to an adversarial model of justice have chosen to place relatively more power
and discretion in the hands of prosecutors than Assistant United States
Attorneys enjoy. By itself, this is a defensible, rational choice -- admittedly
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Another noteworthy distinction is that the Romanian rules of
evidence, unlike the Federal Rules of Evidence. 3 permit the use

of hearsay. In Romania, out-of-court statements offered to prove
the truth of the matter asserted are allowed into evidence not only
4
in exceptional cases, but as a matter of course in criminal trials.

Although some of the distinctive characteristics of Romania's
criminal justice system reflect understandable differences of
quite different from the American model. As is discussed in greater detail
below, however, where Romania parts from its continental European partners - and where the system, in my view, begins to shed its moral justification - is
in the extent to which the greater decision power given prosecutors is
unchecked by independent judicial authority.
3. See FED. R. EvID. 801.
4. Once again, by itself, this choice to permit different kinds of evidence
than are allowed as a rule in American courtrooms is not in itself problematic.
so long as other safeguards are employed to ensure the reliability which
American prohibitions against hearsay are traditionally intended to produce. In
fact. Romanian law utilizes a number of methods to insure the reliability of
evidence presented at trial. One of the most common is the pre-indictment
procedure known as the "confrontation." This is an investigative tool which,
though unknown in American federal practice. is often one of the crucial
weapons in the prosecutor's pre-trial arsenal.
The bulk of proof in most Romanian criminal investigations consists of the
"declarations" of witnesses or suspects - handwritten police and prosecutor
summaries of witnesses' (or suspects') statements in response to questioning.
When, during the course of a criminal investigatiop, the declarations of two
witnesses (or one witness and one suspect) conflict in important ways, the
prosecutor will commonly call both witnesses (or the witness and the suspect)
before her so that each can answer questions in the presence of the other. By
compelling the witnesses to confront one another with their contrasting
testimonies, the prosecutor hopes that one of the two will concede that he is
mistaken or has previously lied, and therefore amend in a manner consistent
with the statements of other witnesses his prior declaration.
Useful as the confrontation is as a means for the prosecution to reconcile
inconsistent versions of events prior to indictment, in practice it is often
insufficient in preventing the widespread use of hearsay evidence from
seriously impairing the accused's ability to probe the integrity and conduct of
the police investigation (commonly the focus of much attention in American
trials). In particular, the near-universal practice of allowing police officers to
submit the results of their investigation in writing, rather than through live
testimony subject to cross-examination, risks impeding the truth-finding
function in the search for evidence of guilt.
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opinion, others are more problematic to one schooled in the
American system. By ceding to the prosecution inordinate and
often unlimited power over the investigation and trial, defendants
are often deprived of certain fundamental protections. These
differences risk seriously compromising the fairness of criminal
proceedings in many cases. The difficulties which attend the
Romanian criminal justice system stem, to some extent, from the
attitudes and behavior of prosecutors who resist shedding the
excessive authority they wielded under the communist regime.
However. not all the problems of the system can be laid at the
prosecutors' door. In fact, many problems pervade the structure
and functioning of the entire criminal process. There is urgent
and substantial need of reform in both the laws that govern
criminal procedure and the manner in which it is practiced.
In order to understand some of these problems, it is helpful to
highlight one of the principal features of most Romanian criminal
investigations, particularly those involving garden variety crimes
such as theft or robbery. It might be alarming to learn of the high
frequency with which police and prosecutors obtain confessions
from defendants. In the majority of cases with which I became
familiar, the defendant's admission of guilt was the principal
piece of evidence in the file. Indeed, confessions are such an
integral part of most criminal investigations that, by law. no
arrest warrant may issue until a prosecutor has first interviewed
the defendant in the presence of his attorney.
In Anglo-American countries, the adversary system virtually
mandates that police and prosecutors proceed on the assumption
that the defendant will not speak to them and that they must
gather other evidence in order to obtain a conviction. By contrast,
in Romania. the heart of many investigations is a series of
interviews the police and prosecutors undertake with the
defendant. Often, numerous interviews are required because most
defendants do not admit their guilt immediately. Defendants must
be persuaded of the futility of persisting in denial; thus, only in
successive interviews does a complete admission generally come
forth.
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One should not assume that Romanian police and prosecutors
do not gather additional evidence. To the contrary, Romanian law
specifies that a confession alone is not sufficient to convict with
additional corroboration. 5 I have examined numerous files in
complex cases chock-full of reports, photographs, test results,
witness interviews and other evidence apart from defendant
admissions. However, it should be noted that the defendant's
admission is the most crucial piece of evidence in the file and
much of the corroborative evidence is often obtained only after
the defendant has confessed to her crime.
Romanian law also includes the familiar provision that a
defendant may not be compelled to incriminate himself. This
conforms with the international standards of fair trial and due
process. In practice, however, the traditionally submissive
attitudes of Romanian citizens towards law enforcement
authorities, combined with the willingness of prosecutors and
police to exploit this vulnerability to their advantage, often
6
deprive the Romanian defendant of this protection.
The pressure on law enforcement authorities to obtain
confessions stems from several factors which include: (1) the
responsibility of the prosecutor in the Romanian system not only
to prove his case, but to find the truth as well, (2) the belief that
best evidence of the truth is the defendant's own admission; and
(3) the fact that the Romanian criminal justice system does not
permit plea bargaining.
During my stay I was repeatedly reminded that Romanian
prosecutors and police are concerned not simply with gathering
enough evidence to prove their case beyond a reasonable doubt,
but with revealing the full truth about what crimes were
committed and who was responsible. I think it fair to say that
prosecutors in Romania, more so than my colleagues in the
United States, see themselves as uniquely responsible for
5. Romanian Code of Criminal Procedure art. 69.

6. I frequently baffled prosecutors and police by asking what legal power
they had to compel witnesses and suspects to submit to questioning, even
where they encountered resistance. Time and again, I was told that, as a
practical matter, Romanian citizens rarely resist police or prosecutorial
requests to answer questions.
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ensuring that each investigation yields the truth regarding the
crimes at issue. However, I do not mean to overstate the
of the distinction
between the
Anglosignificance
American/adversarial and Continental/inquisitorial models of
justice or the extent to which any one national justice system
embodies the attributes solely of one model or the other.
The vigorous search for the truth is due in part to the fact that
the Romanian criminal justice system relies more exclusively than
the American system on the judgment of prosecutors to ensure
that the investigation and trial yield the truth. Prosecutors in the
United States are often said to be more than mere advocates.
They owe allegiance not only to the cause of conviction, but to
the overarching promise that justice will be done. 7 American
prosecutors are not alone in their search for justice. They are
supported by vigorous defense counsel and independent judges,
along with constitutional, procedural and evidentiary rules which
check prosecutorial discretion. Romanian prosecutors generally
stand alone in the search for justice and truth, and many are
pleased to exercise the greater power which is implied by that
task. The success of a Romanian criminal investigation and trial
in producing a just outcome stands or falls on the shoulders of
prosecutors.
In keeping with the Romanian prosecutor's higher moral
purpose, law enforcement officials do not simply gather enough
evidence to persuade a judge or jury. They seek the most
compelling evidence of guilt -- the defendant's own admission.
Cast partially in the role of confessors, many prosecutors require
a confession as the only reliable proof of what really occurred. It
should not be surprising that prosecutors instinctively look first to
the accused herself as the best source of the evidence, particularly
in a society where confessions, however obtained, have long been
customary.
The absence of plea-bargaining discretion by the Romanian
prosecutor places additional pressure on both police and
prosecutors to seek confessions. The ability to plea bargain
allows American prosecutors to dispose of cases as they see fit.
7. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3-1.2 (1992).
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In the United States, the prosecutor has the authority to allow a
defendant to plead guilty to a lesser charge than that contained in
the charging instrument. 8 This authority acts as a safety valve for
an overcrowded criminal justice system and for overworked
prosecutors who must ration their limited energy and resources
according to the relative strength of each case. Where an
investigation does not gather overwhelming evidence of guilt,
prosecutors may accept a plea to a lesser charge. rather than risk
acquittal at trial. In Romania, however, all cases are sent to court
for trial. Prosecutors do not have the luxury of picking and
choosing among cases based upon the quantum of evidence. The
absence of the plea-bargaining safety valve forces police and
prosecutors to gather sufficient evidence of guilt in every case.
The most compelling proof of guilt, and often among the easiest
to obtain if the defendant can be persuaded to cooperate, is a
confession.
Many of the factors contributing to the undue pressure on
Romanian prosecutors and police to obtain confessions exist in
other European countries which employ a civil law system of
justice. Fortunately, in many of these countries other factors
counteract the pressures on prosecutors and police to obtain
confessions. These factors include: a strong and independent
judiciary, an able corps of trained and effective defense
attorneys, and a tradition of respect for individual rights. The
overall effect is that defendants in many of these countries
generally receive both fair trials and due process. In Romania.
these countervailing tendencies are often minimal or absent.
Below I discuss some of the deficiencies which currently plague
the Romanian criminal justice system. Each one by itself would
not likely produce the gross distortions of power which presently
afflict the criminal process. When combined, however, these
deficiencies ensure that the system as a whole suffers from the
exercise of inordinate influence by police and prosecutors over
the conduct and outcome of criminal investigations and trials.

8. See FED.

R. CRIM.

P. I l(c)(1).
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A. The Prosecutors
Not surprisingly, prosecutors in Romania are widely seen, and
generally see themselves, as the most powerful actors in the
system. Forty years of Communist rule left scars all over this
society. but nowhere more so than in prosecutorial offices.
Prosecutors in Romania exercise far greater legal authority with
less judicial supervision than do their counterparts in the United
States and Western Europe. Under the communist regime,
prosecutors were among the principal executioners of state policy
and had broad power to ensure compliance with the law. The
attitude of many prosecutors toward their colleagues on the bench
and within the defense bar was often more tolerant than
respectful. Despite the six-year transition from communism to a
democratic form of government, surprisingly little has changed.
Prosecutors in Romania possess the legal power to issue arrest
and search warrants without judicial authorization. In Romania,
unlike in the United States, where a defendant's fate is decided at
trial, by the time an indictment is prepared and the file submitted
to court, the prosecutor has usually already made the essential
decisions. He has decided which physical evidence to gather,
which tests to perform, and which witnesses to call. These
decisions will effectively determine the outcome of the case.
Admittedly, this in part reflects the civil law tradition wherein the
proof at trial consists of a "case file" containing written
documents prepared by the prosecutor and the police. However,
unlike in many other civil law countries, judges in Romania have
no role in the investigation prior to indictment. Prosecutors make
virtually all decisions regarding investigative techniques
independently. This entails a delicate balancing of society's
interest in obtaining evidence of crime and the liberty of the
individual. In many other European countries, as well as in the
United States, this responsibility is reserved for judges.
Moreover, even during trial. Romanian judges play a more
limited role than their counterparts in other civil law countries,
often simply deferring to the findings reached by prosecutors
during the investigative stage. Accordingly, many prosecutors
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view court proceedings as an unnecessary duplication of work
they have already completed.
Following the events of 1989, calls for restrictions on
prosecutorial authority were made with increasing frequency.
However, prosecutors have remained decidedly resistant to the
notion that their authority should be curtailed. They have, thus
far, largely succeeded in forestalling efforts to change the way
that they investigate and prosecute crimes. Six years after the
revolution, prosecutors continue to do their work essentially as
they did it under Ceausescu. 9 Despite the implementation of
certain reforms, the criminal justice system continues to reinforce
a general tendency toward unreviewed prosecutorial power.
Perhaps unwittingly, one senior prosecutor, in a moment of
uncharacteristic candor, underlined the continuity between the
present and former systems. "So you see, Jim," he said, "we are
not Communist gorillas who just fell out of the trees. We have a
good justice system. And it is the same justice system we had
under Ceausescu. It was a good justice system then, too."
Prosecutors who see themselves as guardians of order, as many
of those in Romania do, might be expected to devote themselves
tirelessly to their task. To the contrary, most prosecutors work a
maximum of eight hours a day, five days a week, with smoking
and coffee breaks interspersed throughout. Weekend work is
unusual. These work habits reflect both the low pay prosecutors
receive and the traditions developed under a forty-year
communist regime wherein employment was guaranteed and
working longer hours was not rewarded or expected. They are
also symptomatic of a more fundamental flaw in the criminal
justice system.
Unlike their counterparts in the United States, prosecutors in
Romania need not spend countless hours meticulously reviewing
their own work and that of the police. The investigative activities
9. Other foreign observers have reached similar conclusions. See. e.g..
A. Spielmann and J. A. Frowein, Report on Human Rights in Romania for the
ParliamentaryAssembly of the Council of Europe, 14 Hu.& Rrs. L.J. 133, 140
(1993) (citing the "procuratura" as one of the "institutions which to a large
extent seem founded on the old principles of a state system where the rule of
law and democratic forces did not prevail").
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of law enforcement officers -- the seizing of physical evidence,
the conducting of forensics tests, and the interviewing of
witnesses and suspects -- will rarely, if ever, be scrutinized
closely by a judge or defense attorney. Largely absent in
Romania is one of the essential features of any criminal justice
system that purports to uphold the rule of law -- the system's
capacity to compel police and prosecutors to conduct their
investigations in a lawful fashion and to prove that they have
done so. Thus, prosecutors behave accordingly.
Similarly, six years after the end of communist rule,
prosecutors in Romania are still willing to entertain political and
other considerations that have no bearing on guilt or the quality
of evidence in deciding whether to indict. This unfortunate
practice severely compromises the prosecutorial commitment to
apply the law impartially. Despite protestations to the contrary,
there are severe problems associated with prosecutions of police
abuse and violence against Roma and other ethnic minorities, two
prominent types of criminal activity. These cases are generally
treated differently from ordinary thefts and robberies. Some of
the problems stem from a tendency among many prosecutors to
discredit those who make allegations of police abuse and violence
against Roma. Further, prosecutions have been sidetracked by the
flexing of political "muscle" on the part of influential interested
parties. That prosecutors have repeatedly succumbed to such
pressures only underlines how elusive the rule of law remains. 10
10. One widely publicized case of violence against members of the Roma
minority illustrates some of the difficulties. In the late afternoon of September

20. 1993. an ethnic Romanian resident of Hadareni, in Mures county, was
killed in a conflict with some Roma men. Shortly thereafter, at about seven

p.m., approximately 400 ethnic Romanian and ethnic Hungarian villagers set
fire to a house with three Roma inside. One Roma man died in the fire, and
two escaped, only to be beaten to death by the mob. Later that evening,

residents of the village set fire to many Roma houses, destroying thirteen and
seriously damaging an additional four.
In November 1993, and again in May 1994, local prosecutors on the case
were quoted by international human rights organizations as saying that
sufficient evidence had been gathered to warrant the arrest and indictment of

more than a dozen individuals implicated in the violence in Hadareni.
However, the chief prosecutor for Mures County complained that indictments
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The widespread resistance to change that prevails in the
prosecutorial corps reflects the fact that many of the most senior

Romanian prosecutors served for many years under the
communist regime. Perhaps understandably, they have retained
many of the attitudes and practices that they acquired before
December of 1989. Habit is a factor in that prosecutors who have
been handling cases the same way for twenty years can hardly be
expected to change. Self-interest is also a factor in that
prosecutors who have grown accustomed to exercising largely
unbridled power under the communist regime are reluctant to
accept new restrictions upon their discretion. Both of these
factors will militate against substantial reform within the
could not be issued, because local political leaders were interfering in the
investigation.
For several days in November 1995. I visited Targu-Mures and spoke about
the case with local prosecutors, police officers, political leaders, and
representatives of non-governmental organizations. It became clear during the
course of this visit that the Hadareni prosecution has been impeded by political
considerations from the start.
Prosecutors involved in the investigation of this case made clear the role of
electoral politics in the prosecution. "For me," one career prosecutor said.
"it's a simple case. I have the evidence" to convict at least eleven persons for
their involvement in the attacks on Roma in Hadareni, but political factors
have prevented the case from going forward. This prosecutor specifically cited
the political power of the Party of Romanian National Unity (PUNR) in Mures
County, as well as the hostility to Roma expressed by many PUNR officials.
According to this prosecutor, PUNR officials at the national and local levels
spoke about the case with senior government officials both within and outside
of the Prosecutor General's Office.
According to prosecutors in Mures County, Gheorghe Bucur. who was at the
time and remains Vice Mayor of Hadareni, intervened in the case in July 1994.
when a number of persons - some of them allegedly Bucur's relatives - were
brought to the prosecutor's offices in Targu-Mures to be formally charged.
According to prosecutors, the protests of Bucur"and other PUNR officials at
the time served to prevent arrest warrants from being issued. When I met with
him. Bucur confirmed that political influence in the Hadareni case reached
high and deep. Bucur acknowledged that he had spoken with senior PUNR
officials about the Hadareni prosecution, and that those officials, in turn, had
complained about the investigation to the Romanian Minister of Justice, as
well as to senior prosecutors and police officials in Targu-Mures and
Bucharest.
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prosecutorial sector until the present generation of senior officials
retires. 11
The importance of seniority is reflected both in the rigid
structure of offices and in the progressively greater amounts of
work experience required to ascend to each level within the
prosecutorial hierarchy. The organization of offices mirrors the
four-tier court system created in 1992 by the Law of Judicial
Organization. Thus. the Prosecutor General's Office, which is
attached to the Supreme Court of Justice (the highest court), is
responsible for exercising control over all other prosecutors.
Below the Prosecutor General's Office are. in downward
succession, the prosecutor's office attached to the Court of
Appeal, the prosecutor's office attached to the "tribunal" (court
of second instance), and the prosecutor's office attached to the
"judecatorie" (court of first instance). 12 In order to join the
prosecutor's office attached to the "tribunal," a prosecutor must
have at least six years of prosecutorial experience. To work in the
prosecutor's office attached to the Court of Appeal, a prosecutor
must have at least ten years of experience. Finally, in order to
advance to the Prosecutor General's Office, a prosecutor must
have at least 15 years under his belt.
Underlying this emphasis on seniority is the principle of
"hierarchical control." which guides prosecutors at each level of
the bureaucracy. Every decision made by an individual
prosecutor in the course of an investigation is subject to review
by superiors within his office and in offices further up the
organizational chain. At the top of the pyramid, officials in the
Prosecutor General's Office have the power to amend or reverse
11. Many new prosecutors have been hired since 1990, but they are
moving up the ladder of power slowly. Since many senior officials are still in
their 40's and 50's, it may take more than a decade for prosecutors entering
the system after 1989 to assume positions of influence.
12. The "judecatorie" has jurisdiction over many common crimes,
including numerous thefts and frauds. The "tribunal" sits as a court of first
instance for more serious crimes, including murder, and as a court of appellate

jurisdiction with respect to cases initially judged in the Judecatorie. The courts
of appeal and the Supreme Court of Justice are primarily, though not
exclusively, appellate courts.
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decisions made by prosecutors in every other office within the
13

country.
The strength of the structure of prosecutorial power is
remarkable. Most of the senior posts in the Prosecutor General's
Office are filled by officials with more than ten years of
supervisory prosecutorial service under Ceausescu. Furthermore,
several prosecutors who presently wield policy-making authority

at the Prosecutor General's Office have distinguished themselves
in the past by their loyalty to powerful government officials or to
the institutions of law enforcement, notwithstanding the demands
of justice. 14

13. The principle of hierarchical control is expressly mandated by the Law
of Judicial Organization (1992).
14. To take one example, in the mid-1980's, a Romanian citizen (the
'victim") was arrested on suspicion of having written a number of entries in
his personal diary which were critical of Ceausescu. The victim was taken to
the lockup maintained by the feared Securitate police force, where he was
beaten to death. A high-level prosecutor (the "first prosecutor") was assigned
the investigation into the victim's death in custody. Relying in part on the
initial medical examiner's report, which was fabricated to indicate that the
victim had died of a heart attack, the first prosecutor reached a "nonindictment decision," concluding that, as the death was not caused by
violence, no Securitate officer could be held responsible.
In 1990, following the fall of the Communist government, the victim's
family demanded that the investigation be re-opened. A second prosecutor was
assigned the case. The investigation was prolonged. The victim's cellmates
from the Securitate lockup at the time of his death were interviewed. A new
medical examiner's report concluded that the victim had been beaten to death.
By 1993, the second prosecutor had accumulated substantial evidence
implicating a Securitate officer in the murder. However, before a formal
charging instrument could be submitted to the court, the first prosecutor,
having since been promoted to a very senior position within the prosecutorial
hierarchy, took the file from the second prosecutor. The first prosecutor kept
the file for some time, after which he sent it, not back to the second
prosecutor, but to a third prosecutor. There the file remains. Many observers
suspect that the second prosecutor's investigation has been squelched for
political reasons.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1997

15

Touro Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 2 [1997], Art. 9

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 13

B. The Judiciary

One of the most striking characteristics of the Romanian
criminal justice system for an observer from the United States is
the limited nature of judicial authority and the relatively low
regard in which many judges are held among both lawyers and
the population at large.
In general, judges exercise less power than do prosecutors over
the course of criminal investigations and the results of trials. This
fact is reflected in the greater status accorded to investigative, as
15
opposed to trial, prosecutors within the prosecutorial branch.
Thus. in contrast to the United States, where a prosecutor often
"cuts her teeth" on trial work, in Romania, the investigation is
where the action is, and prosecutors commonly make their mark
solving a crime. It is the prosecutor who, together with the
police, during the investigative phase builds the case file that
eventually reaches the court. To a great extent, therefore, the
prosecutor literally shapes what the judge will consider at the
time of trial. In the view of many prosecutors, by the time a
typical criminal case file gets to court, all the relevant witnesses
have been interviewed, all necessary evidence has been gathered,
and all that remains is for the judge to affirm what the prosecutor
has already found -- that the defendant is guilty. Judges, of
course, can and do re-interview witnesses, seek additional
evidence, and draw different conclusions than the investigative
prosecutor. In most cases, however, a judge will go along with
the prosecutor's findings. Where many trials are simply
reaffirmations of pre-indictment prosecutorial actions, rather than
a true contest over the facts, it should not be surprising that

15. In Romania, prosecutors divide themselves according to function.
Certain prosecutors work on investigations -- either by themselves or
supervising the police in gathering evidence to build a case. Other prosecutors
work in court, either at trial or on appeals. These prosecutors are assigned to
the case only after the investigation has been completed and an indictment
(rechizitoriu)has been drafted and submitted with the case file to the court.
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prosecutors involved in investigations are frequently considered
16
more "macho" and important than their trial colleagues.
The relative power of prosecutors vis-A-vis judges is a function,
in part, of the fact that like prosecutors, judges may join the
magistracy immediately upon graduation from law school.
Insofar as students obtain the equivalent of a J.D. degree in
Romania after only four years of university education, newly
minted judges may take the bench in their mid- to late-twenties.
Prosecutors twice that age and older -- who have been in office
for 10, 15, 20 and 25 years -- can hardly be expected to accord
these younger judges much respect.
Moreover, the attitude of dismissive superiority which some
prosecutors display toward judges at times extends beyond the
personal to the institutional actions of prosecutors' offices. The
Prosecutor General's Office has gone so far as to disregard the
rulings of the Constitutional Court, a judicial body established
after the revolution to adjudicate constitutional questions. Thus,
in July 1994, the Court limited the application of Article 200 of
the Criminal Code -- which criminalized homosexual conduct -to those acts which provoke public scandal or are perpetrated in
public places. 17 Notwithstanding this authoritative construction of
the law, a number of prosecutions have subsequently been
brought, and at least two convictions secured, for violation of
Article 200 where the homosexual conduct at issue did not
provoke public scandal and was not perpetrated in public.
Prosecutors have also disregarded Constitutional Court rulings
regarding offenses against state property and the imposition of
terms of imprisonment for failure to pay a court-levied fine.
Finally, the greater power of prosecutors is rooted. not merely
in their own attitudes, but in the law itself. Thus, under the Code
of Criminal Procedure, prosecutors may and do issue search
warrants and arrest warrants on their own, without judicial
16. In a society which, like Romania's, still has a long way to go in the
struggle for gender equality, it is perhaps not insignificant that, among the
investigative prosecutors I met, men generally outnumbered women, while the
reverse was true among trial prosecutors.

17. Decision Number 81 of the Court, dated July 15, 1994.
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authorization or knowledge. And, although the lawfulness of an
arrest can later be reviewed by a judge, there exists no

mechanism whereby judges may second-guess prosecutors'
decisions to issue search warrants. A defendant who believes that
a search warrant was improperly issued must appeal to a
supervisory prosecutor at each level in the hierarchical chain. If,
at the end of this internal appeal procedure, the Prosecutor

General affirms the initial decision to issue the warrant, a
defendant has no further recourse in the courts.

18

The Romanian Constitution further contributes to the
subordination of the judiciary in the manner of judges' selection
and discipline. Thus, the Superior Council of Magistracy, which

must confirm all judicial appointments made by the president and
discipline judges once in office, is composed of prosecutors as
well as judges. As a result, the professional careers of judges
depend not only on other judges but on prosecutors as well.
Prosecutors, by contrast, are subject to the disciplinary authority
of a body composed solely of their peers. 19
18. Under the National Security Law, prosecutors may also issue warrants
for electronic surveillance -- i.e., wiretaps -- in cases involving threats to
national security. Once again, no judicial authorization is required, and the
courts have no power to entertain the claims of citizens who believe their
rights have been violated. Rather, such claims must be presented to the
Prosecutor General's Office -- the same institution which has the exclusive
power to the issue a warrant in the first place.
19. Prosecutors' expansive role in the administration of criminal justice,
and their own sense of superiority in relation to judges, were revealed during a
trip I made to Targu-Mures in November 1995. On November 20, all judges
of the first instance court of Targu-Mures refused to conduct trials in protest
against the failure of the President to grant them life tenure, as the law
required. The Law of Judicial Organization of 1992 provides that all judges
except those on the Supreme Court of Justice have life tenure, and requires the
President to so declare within two years of the effective date of the Law -- i.e.,
by August 1994. As of November 1995, President Iliescu had failed to render
the required declarations for a large number of judges. Significantly, it fell to a
prosecutor -- in the prosecutor's office attached to the Court of Appeal in
Mures County -- to ask the judges to go back to work. When they refused, the
prosecutor contacted his colleagues at the Prosecutor General's Office in
Bucharest. An official at the Prosecutor General's Office told his colleague in
Mures County to do what he had to do to get the judges back to work. After
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C. The CriminalDefense Bar
Criminal defense attorneys in Romania are, in many ways,
second class citizens of the justice system. Particularly in cases
involving ordinary theft or robbery, defense counsel generally
lack the status and legal authority enjoyed by prosecutors. Both
the legacy of the communist system of justice -- in which much

of the defense bar essentially acquiesced in the demands of state
prosecutorial power -- and the paucity of capable, aggressive.

independent criminal defense attorneys, contribute to this
inequality.
Perhaps the most visible manifestation of the disparity between
prosecutors and defense attorneys becomes apparent the moment
one walks into a courtroom in Romania where a criminal case is
being tried. At the front of the room, as in most courtrooms in
the Western world, judges in black robes sit behind a long
bench. 20 In Romania, two other persons are seated at the bench.
To the judges' left sits the court clerk. To the judges' right sits
the prosecutor. Defense attorneys sit down below the bench in the
well of the courtroom.
Many defense attorneys complain that prosecutors exercise a
disproportionate influence over the outcomes and course of
criminal trials through their privileged and unequal access to
judges. Bucharest Bar Association officials report that prosecutors
and judges frequently engage in ex parte conversations - outside
the presence of defendants or defense counsel -- about pending

cases. In some instances, these conversations take place out of
public view. In other instances, neither party attempts to hide the
fact that ex parte communications are occurring. According to
additional appeals to the judges' collective sense of responsibility, the courts
finally reopened. Days later, the prosecutor in Targu-Mures complained.
"These judges have stupid ideas that they are independent."
20. The number of judges depends on the kind of case at issue and the
particular court.
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some defense attorneys, in the middle of the courtroom a
prosecutor might simply raise a piece of paper to cover his
mouth, then speak in a low voice to the judges while the
defendant and his lawyer look on in helpless befuddlement.
By contrast, in many cases defense attorneys and their clients
often lack the opportunity to confer in private. In courtrooms,
police officers frequently overhear conversations between
defendants held in pre-trial detention and their attorneys. During
interviews in prosecutorial offices, prosecutors and police are
commonly privy to the conversations that take place between
21
defendants and their lawyers.
These problems are compounded by the ineffective assistance
provided -- through the system of assignment ex oficio -- to
defendants who cannot afford to retain private counsel.
According to the Bar Association, approximately 400 lawyers in
Bucharest currently accept assignment of cases ex oficio on behalf
of criminal defendants. The ex oficio system frequently
discourages assigned counsel from providing clients with
vigorous representation. At the same time. it is susceptible to
police manipulation.
Under the panel system of assignment operative in federal
courts in the United States, private attorneys are paid by the hour
to represent indigent defendants. 22 In Romania. as of 1996, each
ex oficio attorney receives a flat fee of 30,000 lei (equivalent to
about ten U.S. dollars) for each case, regardless of the amount of
time devoted to representation. Accordingly, a lawyer assigned ex
oficio has little incentive to do more than the bare minimum, that
is. show up in court on the date of an appearance. Judging by the
number of postponements due to the failure of defense attorneys
to appear on scheduled dates, even this requirement appears to be
more than some attorneys can bear.23
21. Indeed, under art. 172 of the Criminal Procedure Code, when in her

determination "the interest of the criminal investigation requires," a prosecutor
may prevent a defendant from contacting his attorney for up to five days while
the defendant is in pretrial detention.
22. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1996).
23. The low fee awarded to ex oficio attorneys is bad enough, but Bar
Association officials advise that the Ministry of Justice, the government body
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Bar Association sources and prisoners at Aiud, Targu-Mures
and Jilava Penitentiaries further complain that ex oficio lawyers
rarely visit their clients in police lockups or in prison. Many
inmates with pending cases interviewed at these institutions did
not know the names of their lawyers and had not spoken with
them for several months. Even then, most reported contact took
place in court, for a few minutes in the presence of police
officers, with no opportunity for private consultation.
Because ex oficio fees are so low, attorneys who take such
cases are under pressure to accept as many as they can to survive
financially. As a result, such attorneys often devote little time to
any one case, and, as noted above, sometimes fail altogether to
keep required court dates. Some judges, understandably
perturbed by the failure of certain ex oficio attorneys to appear at
scheduled proceedings, have taken to asking other attorneys who
happen to be present on the day a case is called to stand in on
behalf of their absent colleagues. One experienced defense
attorney related that he was recently asked to fill in for an absent
ex oficio lawyer on behalf of a defendant who was to be
sentenced. Not having reviewed the file, the attorney had no
knowledge of the case or the defendant's background. He simply
stood up and gave a pat appeal for leniency before sentence was
imposed.
The method of assignment utilized by the present ex oficio
system further contributes to the poor quality of representation.
Generally, assignment is limited to one phase of a case - either
investigation or trial, not both. Hence, when trial commences,
defendants are often represented by newly assigned lawyers who
are not familiar with the course of the investigation prior to
indictment.
Additionally, even where more than one defendant is charged,
only one ex oficio lawyer is often assigned to represent all the
defendants in a case who cannot afford their own attorneys. This
gives rise to numerous potential and actual conflicts of interest
which should -- but in Romania do not -- bar continued
responsible for reimbursing attorneys under the system, frequently delays
payments for long periods of time.
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representation by the same attorney of more than one defendant
in the case. I spoke with an attorney who was assigned ex oficio
to represent two defendants, each of whom during police and
prosecutorial questioning had implicated the other in criminal
activity. When I asked the attorney about the possible problems
inherent in her continued joint representation, she said it did not
matter, since both defendants had admitted their guilt. Among
other things, this response ignores conflicts arising from the
participants' relative culpability (i.e., who was the leader and
who the follower) which might arise at sentencing, as well as the
possibility that either or both defendants would subsequently
recant their prior admissions.
Finally. the system of ex oficio assignment is susceptible to
manipulation by the police. At present, ex oficio attorneys are not
assigned randomly to cases according to a pre-established duty
roster. Rather, when the police arrest a defendant, they may
choose which lawyer to call. Often, the police call only those
lawyers with whom they have established relationships.
Understandably, the police look for attorneys who accommodate
their needs, not those who might provide the most vigorous
defense. I have observed the results of this police-friendly
assignment system in practice. Ex oficio attorneys permit clients
to sign written statements without reading them. They also
encourage clients to admit to non-charged criminal activity, even
absent any indication that the police could prove such crimes
without the defendant's admission. 24
As presently implemented, the ex oficio system serves the
interest of everyone but the defendant. Defense attorneys favored
by the police gain more frequent case assignments, and the
relatively steady flow of income that results. The police and
prosecutors gain the obvious benefits that the power to choose
24. Bar Association officials complain that, even where an arrested
defendant has a retained lawyer, police frequently do not permit the defendant
to contact that lawyer during the initial 24-hour detention period. Rather,
during that time, the police commonly arrange for a favored ex oficio attorney
to represent the defendant. Any admissions the defendant makes during the

initial detention period severely compromise the ability of a privately retained
attorney subsequently to defend the case.
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attorneys affords: a more pliant defense, greater frequency of
confessions, and less combative relationships with their legal
adversaries.
D. The Police
Like prosecutors, police officers retain a special status in law
which stems from their outsized role as an organ of state power
during four decades of communist rule. The different
manifestations of this legacy of communism -- from enhanced
salaries to the lingering military justice system to a virtual
immunity from the obligation to testify in court -- all reinforce
those tendencies in the criminal justice system which undermine
the fairness of investigations and trials.
25
By law, the salaries of police officers are not public.
Nonetheless, both police and prosecutorial officials confirmed
that. by and large, the police are better paid than both prosecutors
and judges. As an example, as of late 1995, the Chief of Police
for Mures County was paid over one million lei per month after
taxes -- more than all but the very highest judicial officers in the
country. In addition, military prosecutors and judges receive
higher salaries than their civilian counterparts. This pay disparity
between the police and prosecutors - and between military and
civilian magistrates -- seems more than idiosyncratic. A society
which rewards its police and military officials more handsomely
than its civilian judges and prosecutors sends a very powerful
signal about who is considered more important.
The disproportionate power of the police is also reflected in the
fact that, as a general rule, police officers do not testify in
criminal trials. Accordingly, the very persons who conduct
searches, make arrests, and build the heart of most criminal cases
are shielded from the rigors of cross-examination, and their work
25. According to information provided by the Romanian Prosecutor
General's Office, the salaries of police officers have been established by law.
then amended by ordinances promulgated by the Prime Minister which have
yet to be published.
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is rarely scrutinized to the extent that live testimony would
require. The principal reason why officers are rarely called as
trial witnesses is that hearsay evidence -- consisting of out-ofcourt statements, including written documents, offered to prove
the truth of the matter asserted -- is generally admissible as
evidence in criminal proceedings in Romania. A judge is
permitted to rely on a written report, even where the report's
author is available to testify orally. Moreover, most reports
prepared by police officers in the course of a criminal
investigation are entitled to special consideration; they are
presumed true unless proven false. Given the difficulty in the
absence of cross-examination of developing concrete evidence
that a report's contents have been fabricated, judges tend to credit
documents authored by the police.
One of the main consequences of police officers' absence from
the courtroom is that common defense claims of police
misconduct do not get the sufficient hearing they require for
proper adjudication. When, for example, a defendant asserts that
(1) he was coerced or tricked into making admissions, or (2) the
police report misrepresents what the defendant said -- not
uncommon claims -- a judge routinely does not require that the
officer in question appear in court to be questioned under oath.
Rather, in most cases, the judge simply records the defendant's
accusations in the file, then resolves the conflict between the
defendant's in-court denial of guilt and his prior admissions
contained in the police report by crediting the latter. As a result,
with limited exceptions, allegations of police misconduct go
uninvestigated, and defendants are convicted on the basis of
26
evidence which is not adequately tested for reliability.
26. In fact, given police officers' understanding that they will never be

called to testify, it should not be surprising that Amnesty International and
other monitoring organizations have reported, as recently as 1995. that
physical abuse of detainees in police lockups is a common practice. I have no

first-hand evidence of such conduct. However, I have received what I believe
to be reliable reports from prosecutors that the police not uncommonly (i) fail
to advise defendants of their rights to remain silent, or (ii) employ threats
and/or physical abuse to obtain confessions from defendants, particularly those

charged with crimes of violence. The pressure to obtain confessions described
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Two additional structural problems diminish the legal system's
capacity to deter police misconduct. First, the police might be
more inclined to avoid improper behavior if their alleged victims
could sue for damages. Unfortunately, the Romanian Civil Code
provides that no citizen may bring a civil action against any party
for conduct which also constitutes a crime under the Penal Code,
27
unless and until the party has first been convicted of the crime.
In practice, this means that police are virtually never the subjects
of civil lawsuits.
Second, more than six years after the end of communist rule
police officers are still considered members of the military who,
when accused of criminal wrongdoing, are investigated by
military prosecutors and judged by military judges in military
courts. Civilian prosecutors may not undertake investigations of
police officers. The rules of law applied in military courts are the
same as those which apply in civilian criminal proceedings.
However, military prosecutors and judges answer to higher
military authorities, not, ultimately, to civilian officials. 28 If an
investigation involves mixed civilian/military elements - i.e.,
both police officers and civilians are suspected of having
committed crimes -- only a military prosecutor may undertake the
prosecution. 29
above, coupled with police officers' knowledge that they will not have to
defend their actions in court, certainly creates a powerful incentive to employ

extra-legal means in the search for evidence.
27. Romanian Civil Code § 998 et seq.

28. Law No. 54/93, the Law on the Organization of Military Courts and
Prosecutors Offices, provides that only active military officers may be
appointed to serve as military judges or prosecutors. All military magistrates.
including judges and prosecutors, have military grades and are promoted in

accordance with the military grading system -- i.e., from colonel to general.
etc. -- set forth by the Ministry of Defense.

29. In January 1993, the Council of Europe Rapporteur for Romania
criticized the reliance on military prosecutors to investigate allegations of
police abuse as "not in keeping with the normal arrangements for supervising
the police force in its dealings with individuals." Speielmann and Frowein.
supra note 7, at 139. The Rapporteur noted that, during a visit to Romania

three months earlier, he had been assured that the rule prohibiting anyone but
military prosecutors from investigating the police for alleged abuse was to be
amended. Id. However, as of December 1995, this rule remained in existence.
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Yet another legacy of the elevated status enjoyed by the police
under communist rule is contained in Articles 238 and 239 of the
Penal Code. Article 238 sets forth the crime of "Offense Against
Authority" as follows: "Damage to the honor (or threat)
proffered in public against one of the persons provided by Article
160, in connection with that person's official duties, if it is of
such nature as to damage the state authority, shall be punished by
prison from 6 months to 5 years." 30 Article 239, defining
"ultraje [outrage]," criminalizes "[i]nsult, libel, (or threat),
whether perpetrated directly or by means of direct
communication against a civil servant holding a position which
presupposes the exercise of state authority, during office hours or
for facts related to his/her duties."
These provisions effectively make it a crime to publicly
criticize police officers and other law enforcement officials, even
where the criticism is truthful. The fact that these laws not only
remain on the books, but continue to serve as the foundation for
criminal prosecutions, only underlines how far the legal system
still has to go if the rule of law is to be firmly established in
Romania.
E. Corruption

Corruption is pervasive throughout the criminal justice system.
At various times, judges, prosecutors. defense attorneys, and the
police sell their decisions to the highest bidder.

Indeed, resistance to change is so pronounced among certain elements in the
government that, in late 1995, the Ministry of the Interior submitted to
Parliament draft legislation which would bar investigation of any police officer

for alleged criminal activity absent express prior authorization by the Interior
Minister. As of December 1995. this proposal was still being considered by a

parliamentary commission.
30. Article 160 refers to any "person serving an important state or public
function." and has been applied by prosecutors and the courts to, among
others, senior police officers.
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Obtaining an accurate accounting of the extent of corruption is
impossible. Introduced to members of the criminal justice system
as a federal prosecutor from the United States, I was hardly in
the best position to witness first-hand any grossly untoward
behavior. Still, numerous reports I received from lawyers, judges
and prosecutors indicate that corruption is endemic in the
Romanian justice system. Some suggest that corruption is most
pronounced in civil and commercial cases, particularly where
large amounts of money are at stake. But even in criminal cases,
stories about payoffs to judges, prosecutors, and defense
attorneys are rampant.
I learned of a number of recent examples. There was the
prosecutor who terminated her criminal investigation of a
prominent candidate for national political office after accepting
gifts from, and sleeping with, the target. There was the judge
who, in a civil property dispute, drafted two diametrically
opposed judgments, then sold both - one to one party, the other,
containing a contrary ruling, to his adversary -- leaving them to
fight it out when they presented the conflicting decisions to the
property clerk's office. And there was the judge who, one year
after quitting the bench to set up his own law office, still kept
more than twenty active case files in his house, to the severe
detriment of defendants in pretrial detention. The defendants'
court dates were continually postponed -- and their detention
prolonged -- until the files could be located. 3 1
Although corruption would appear to be rife among judges and
prosecutors, it is not absent among the defense bar either. Not
long ago, the mother of a young man arrested and jailed pending
trial approached a friend who happened to be a prosecutor to
explain that the lawyer, assigned the case ex oficio, was doing
nothing for her son. Upon hearing the facts, the prosecutor
concluded that the defendant should be released upon making a
standard written application to the judge, then prepared such a
document for the mother to give to the defense attorney. When
31. In fairness, it is not clear whether the judge had simply neglected to
return the files, or was keeping them in order to benefit financially in some
way from his continued possession of them.
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approached, the attorney refused to do anything absent payment
of a 100,000 lei ($US 33) fee. The mother, who survived on a
40.000 lei ($US 13) monthly government pension, pleaded with
the attorney, who finally agreed to submit the application
prepared by the prosecutor only if the mother could pull together
10,000 lei ($US 3). The mother, bereft and desperate for her son
to come home, approached the prosecutor, who gave her the
money so the defense attorney would do his job.
Although not an excuse for corruption, the extremely low pay
received by judges and prosecutors is certainly one of its causes.
Law No. 52/1991 on the Salaries of the Staff of the Judiciary
(1991) provides for equivalent salaries for judges and prosecutors
at the same grade of seniority. At the high end of the scale, as of
1996, a Judge on the Supreme Court of Justice and the Attorney
General earned roughly the same monthly salary -- approximately
1.5 million lei ($US 500) after taxes. In the middle range, a
senior, non-supervisory judge or prosecutor with twelve years
experience earned about 750,000 lei (less than $US 300) monthly
after taxes. At the bottom, a beginning judge or prosecutor with
no more than two years' experience earned approximately
400.000 lei ($US 200) monthly after taxes. Since 1989, the
potential income of successful attorneys in private practice has far
exceeded magistrates' meager salaries, and, as a consequence,
has acted as a drain on the staffs of the courts and the prosecutors
attached to them. Partly as a result of this mass exodus to the
private sector, fewer than two-thirds of the more than 1,500
prosecutorial positions nationwide were filled as of December
1995.

II. PRELIMINARY SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
AND ASSISTANCE
As noted above, my own presence at the Prosecutor General's
Office came about through the Rule of Law Program of the
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United States Information Service and the cooperation of the
Department of Justice. Since 1990, agencies of the United States
government, the American Bar Association and other
organizations have sponsored a variety of assistance programs
designed broadly to assist Romania in bringing its legal order -criminal, civil, and commercial -- into conformity with Western

standards. These programs have enjoyed varying degrees of
success in promoting exchanges of ideas among judges.
prosecutors, government officials, and members of the bar. 32 As
indicated in the foregoing discussion, Romania's criminal justice
system still requires numerous changes -- in law and practice -- if

it is to consistently produce fair trials and due process in the
search for the truth. Below I offer three possible areas of focus
for future legal assistance programs: (1) aiding the Romanian
Parliament in reforming criminal legislation; (2) helping to train
the criminal defense bar: and (3) promoting clinical legal
education.

A. Assisting Parliament in Reforming Legislation Related to
Crimes and Criminal Procedure

Some of the most serious problems which plague Romania's
criminal justice system stem from the law itself. The Penal Code
and Code of Criminal Procedure both date from 1969.
Understandably, they reflect the Communist regime in which
they were born. Although members of Parliament recently spent
more than two years considering a series of amendments to these
codes, the proposed changes were rejected in late November
1995. A year later, debate on necessary reforms resumed,
following the change in government brought about by national
elections in the fall of 1996. Reform of existing laws, urgently
32. See generally the comprehensive and searching analysis of United
States legal assistance programs in T. Carothers (Carnegie Endowment 1996).
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required to remedy Romania's ailing criminal justice system, is
thus on the agenda for legislative action in the next year or two.
Accordingly, assistance to members of Parliament and their staffs
in the drafting of amended criminal legislation is not only
necessary, it is timely.

1. Addressing Rule of Law Problems
Some of the legislative reforms which might be considered
address the kinds of problems -- a number of which are discussed
above -- which give the police and prosecutors a disproportionate
position in the criminal justice system. Thus, American law
enforcement experts, judges. and attorneys could, in conjunction
with their Romanian counterparts: (1) educate members of
Parliament and their staffs about the distorting effects of certain
existing legislative provisions, and (2) help formulate
modifications necessary to bring Romania into compliance with
international rule of law standards. 33 Some of the possible
legislative amendments which require serious consideration
include the following:
0 Remove from prosecutors the unilateral authority to issue
search, arrest and electronic surveillance warrants, and require
that judges (i) participate in the initial decision to issue a warrant,
and (ii) have the power to review both the initial issuance of the
warrant, and law enforcement actions taken pursuant thereto.

33. 1 will not explore the precise contours of such a parliamentary
assistance program. It may well be that such a program should envision not
only technical assistance to the legislative drafters, but also educational and/or
organizational assistance to a range of actors in Romanian society -- from
human rights advocates to public interest lawyers, journalists and defense
attorneys -- who have, since 1989, been pushing for change in the criminal
justice system.
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Alter the structure of the Superior Council of Magistrates to
ensure that prosecutors do not participate in the hiring or
disciplining of judges.
a Amend the criminal procedure code to provide that a
defendant in pre-trial detention may not be denied the right to
consult with his attorney.
n Increase salaries for judges and prosecutors to levels above
those for police officers of comparable experience and seniority.
* Reform the ex oficio system of assigning criminal defense
attorneys for indigent defendants by increasing the fees paid to
attorneys, linking payment to the quantity of time devoted to
representation, creating a tamper-proof random assignment
system, and barring representation of more than one defendant
per case.
, Reduce reliance on ex oficio attorneys by creating a public
defender system, i.e., offices of attorneys employed full-time by
the government to represent criminal defendants.
- Exclude from the jurisdiction of military prosecutors and
judges cases in which the police are under investigation for
possible criminal conduct, and specifically authorize civilian
prosecutors to investigate and prosecute, and civilian judges to
judge, cases involving crimes by police officers.
- Amend the criminal procedure code to provide that the
employment status of the author does not by itself entitle reports
by police and other law enforcement officers -- i.e. process
verbal -- to any greater or lesser evidentiary weight than written

documents prepared by others.
- Allow private citizens to bring civil lawsuits against, and
collect monetary damages from, law enforcement officers for
alleged misconduct, even where no criminal charges are brought.
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- Amend provisions of the penal code defining crimes of
outrage and offense against authority to ensure that law
enforcement officials enjoy no greater immunity from public
criticism than private citizens.

2. New Substantive Criminal Legislation

In addition to promoting the foregoing reforms, assistance
should also be considered in the area of substantive criminal
legislation. Here, however, the needs are not as clear, and further
study of existing problems is necessary. Romanian law
enforcement officials are quick to claim that a surge of criminal
activity has afflicted Romania in the wake of communism's fall,
and that new legislation and Western tools are needed to combat
the new criminals. There is some truth to this notion, but it must
be examined carefully.
I think the extent of Romania's vulnerability, and thus the
potential need for new or reformed legislation, is clearest with
respect to financial crimes -- particularly money laundering -and, to a lesser extent, narcotics trafficking. No one knows
precisely how much illegally obtained money is currently flowing
through Romania. However, with a cash economy in which
personal checking accounts are still unknown, the country is
attractive to criminals looking to launder the proceeds of illicit
transactions. At present, Romania has no money laundering law
or any requirement that cash transactions over a certain amount
be reported. United States law enforcement officials can assist the
Romanian parliament in its efforts to remedy these problems.
Similarly, notoriously corrupt border police make the country
particularly inviting to international narcotics dealers. Existing
narcotics legislation, which dates from the 1960's and provides
for relatively insubstantial terms of imprisonment (particularly by
comparison with American laws), must be adapted to cope with a
growing influx of transit activity from the East, and, as incomes
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rise for some, the beginnings of a domestic market for drugs. 34
Once again, given the United States' long and expensive, if far
from victorious, battle against drug trafficking, American
assistance in the legislative drafting process would be useful.
With respect to organized crime, the nature of the problem is
less clear. At present there is no overarching law directed against

organized crime in Romania. As of December 1995, officials at
the Ministries of Justice and Interior were working on draft
legislation concerning organized crime, which apparently draws
on American and Western European models.
When asked to describe the kinds of organized crime presently

in Romania, prosecutors and police give vague and often
contradictory responses. Some suggest there is no organized

crime; others warn that the country is being besieged by it.
Specifics, however, are few and far between. Many law
enforcement officials include within the rubric of organized crime
a two or three-man con game robbing tourists in front of the
Intercontinental Hotel. Others report more substantial items,
though their frequency is not known: murders and armed
robberies by bands of former Russian soldiers in Moldavia,
extortion rackets by Chinese immigrants demanding protection

payments

from their countrymen

operating

businesses

in

Bucharest, illegal immigrant smuggling, 35 the counterfeiting of
34. Until 1989, drug dealing was virtually non-existent in Romania. In the
years following the events of December 1989, the number and size of seizures
have increased significantly. Thus, according to the General Inspectorate of
Police (the Romanian language acronym is "IGP"), in 1991. 35 kilograms of
narcotics (of all kinds) were seized by Romanian police. In 1992, 30.5
kilograms were seized. In 1993. 11 tons and 380 kilograms (most of this in
one seizure) were seized. In 1994, 1,900 kilograms were seized.
According to the IGP, the composition of the drug traffickers has changed
over the five years since the revolution. In 1991-92, most drug traffickers were
foreign citizens. Today, more than half the drug dealers operating in the
country are Romanian citizens.
35. According to IGP officials, the principal route for illegal immigrant
smuggling starts in India and Pakistan, goes through Moscow. Chisinau.
Bucharest. and Budapest, and ends in Austria and Germany. Immigrants are
typically concealed inside trucks or railway cars along with items of
merchandise. From 1991 to the fall of 1995, more than 50,000 illegal
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Romanian and foreign currencies, and trafficking in stolen cars.
Given the lack of knowledge on the part even of many Romanian
prosecutors as to the extent of the organized crime problem,
further investigation is required before precise legislative
remedies can be prescribed.
With respect to violent crimes, such as murder and physical
assault, Romania knows nothing of the rate or severity of
criminal activity we must endure in the United States. According
to one leading Romanian homicide prosecutor, there were eightytwo murders in 1994 throughout the entire city of Bucharest, with
a population of 2.3 million. This murder rate pales in comparison
to New York's. Despite the influx of armed Russian, Chinese and
Middle Eastern gangs, guns are still extremely rare among
members of the general public. Thus, only one of the eighty-two
murders in 1994 was by gunshot.
As economic difficulties increase during the long transition to a
market economy, and as criminal organizations avail themselves
of Romania's outdated criminal laws, the crime rate, including
violent crime, will no doubt increase. Indeed. this has already
begun to take place. In 1995. according to the General
Inspectorate of Police. crimes of all kinds occurred at a rate five
times that of 1989. However. most Romanians have still not been
forced to adopt even the most basic personal security measures
common in Western countries. For example. although the rate of
theft appears to be rising rapidly, the front entrances of most
Bucharest apartment buildings remain unlocked twenty-four hours
a day.
The Romanian government should, of course, prepare for a
more dangerous world with more sophisticated criminals, and law
enforcement officials will need different tools to deal with those
threats. 36 But that world has not yet arrived. It is within this
immigrants who were being smuggled into Romania were captured at the
Romanian border.
36. In the fight against crime, the Romanian government has already
increased its deployment of manpower resources since 1989. There are
currently 53,000 police officers nationwide, approximately 40% more than in
1989. In addition, a squad within the IGP specifically devoted to the
investigation of organized crime and narcotics was formed in 1993. It consists
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context -- of a society undergoing significant change, but, by
comparison to much of the West, still remarkably non-violent that American assistance in the reform of Romania's substantive
criminal legislation should be considered.

B. Training CriminalDefense Attorneys
One of the most serious problems hampering the criminal
justice system is the paucity of able defense attorneys available to
represent the majority of defendants charged with crimes. As
noted above, most criminal defense attorneys in Romania
typically adopt a passive role with respect to the prosecution. It is
rare in my experience for a defense attorney to perform many of
the tasks which many American criminal defense attorneys
undertake as a matter of course, for example, interview witnesses
prior to trial, research the strengths and weaknesses of the
government's expected witnesses, or conduct an independent
investigation into the facts of the case.
Even absent legislative reforms along the lines suggested
above, a more effective and less docile criminal defense bar
would go a long way toward improving the fairness of most
criminal investigations and trials. Lawyers who demand access to
defendants in police lock-ups in the first hours after arrest, who
insist on the right to confer privately with their clients, who
educate their clients about the risks of speaking with police
officers or prosecutors, who interview prosecution witnesses on
their own and develop inconsistencies as the basis for attacks on
the witnesses' credibility, and who act in such a way as to give
force to the presumption of innocence, could, I believe, make a
genuine difference. With a tradition of vigorous representation on
behalf of criminal defendants and a plethora of talented,
experienced defense counsel, the United States is well-qualified
of 125 police in Bucharest, plus between seven and 23 police officers and sub-

officers in each of the 40 other counties nationwide.
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to offer training to Romanian attorneys in the ethics, tactics and
strategies of criminal defense.
Through workshops, lectures, training sessions, mock trials and
other educational devices, American defense attorneys could help
their Romanian colleagues in a number of ways. First, by their
very presence and example, Americans would serve as vital role
models -- which are sorely lacking in Romania -- of economically
successful. intellectually powerful, morally upstanding and highly
respected attorneys who devote their working days to the defense
of persons charged with crimes.
Second, United States defense attorneys might provide training
in specific skills which are critical to effective advocacy on behalf
of criminal defendants, such as critical reading of police reports
and scientific tests, arguing for leniency at sentencing, and crossexamining witnesses. 37 Other topics might include counseling a
client charged with a crime: reconciling the obligation to defend
zealously a client's interests with adherence to ethical standards
of professional behavior: and dealing with prosecutors and the
police.
Finally, assistance programs might bring one or more
American public defenders to Romania to help in the
establishment of a public defender office. During my stay in the
country, a number of attorneys and government officials
mentioned the desirability of such an office. The effort to
establish a publicly funded defender service would have to
address the concerns of private lawyers who fear competition for
a limited client base. Still. an adequately funded and staffed
public defender office could well have a significant positive
impact on Romanian criminal justice, and the U.S. could help
make such an office a reality.

37. In Romania, lawyers do not directly address witnesses. Rather, they
may suggest questions for the judge to ask.
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C. Contributingto Legal Education
Governmental and private legal assistance programs could also
contribute to the education of law students and young prosecutors
and judges. Among the goals of this effort would be to improve
advocacy and problem-solving skills, and to highlight the ethical
component of legal practice. In addition, by offering as lecturers
"real-life" examples of satisfied, adequately-compensated lawyers
engaged in criminal practice, the program would help encourage
the best and brightest among the nation's law students to consider
public service and criminal law as careers following
38
graduation.
At present, younger prosecutors and judges would benefit from
training in written and oral advocacy skills and courses
addressing and reinforcing ethical obligations. In addition, a
course in comparative criminal law and procedure might, by
exposing students to Western models of criminal justice, produce
more enthusiastic and better informed advocates of reform.
The Magistrates' School, which presently offers courses in
Romanian law to newly minted judges and prosecutors. could
serve as one appropriate forum for classes and workshops. The
law school at the University of Bucharest would provide another
forum in which to support classes and clinical programs for law
students.

38. Of course, financial grants to encourage young law school graduates to
embark upon careers in criminal defense would be helpful as well.
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